

7th June 2019

## Market Recommendations

### BANKING SECTOR:

#### KCB Group

We recommend a **LONG TERM BUY** on KCB. The counter is currently trading at a P/B of 1.07x (at a price of KES 39.55) against an industry average of 0.85x as at 7th June 2019. Furthermore, KCB has a dividend yield of 8.8%, higher than the industry average of 5.6%. KCB has a high ROaE of 21.9% against an industry average of 13.5%. We believe the group's strategic partnerships and digital transformation will continue to deliver growth. However, we note with concern on the sluggish growth of operating income, as we opine that the group's cost minimization efforts can't be solely relied on to support bottom-line growth.

In a bid to grow its market presence and leadership position, the company has resulted to mergers and acquisitions (inorganic growth). The bank is currently expected to takeover certain assets and liabilities of Imperial bank and has also offered to fully (100%) takeover National Bank of Kenya (NBK). Additionally, the bank is looking to acquire two banks; one in Rwanda and one in DRC.

In the proposed NBK takeover, KCB Group has offered 1 KCB share for every 10 shares of NBK. Our initial thoughts are that takeover of NBK is more of a bailout. NBK will benefit from better corporate governance

(a key concern for us) and the capital injection (NBK's capital ratios are below the statutory minimums). KCB will benefit from the additional deposits but it will be interesting to see how KCB deals with NBK's low asset (loan book) quality.

#### 1Q2019 Results commentary:

The Group posted an 11.4% y/y growth in after tax profits for 1Q2019 to KES 5.8 billion. The growth in profitability was predominantly attributed to a 10.6% y/y growth in total operating income to KES 18.8 billion. Net interest income rose by 11.2% y/ to KES 12.7 billion. Non-funded income grew by 9.2% y/y to KES 6.1 billion owing to a 100.4% y/y surge in income from fees and commissions on loans to KES 2.2 billion. Despite a 2.4% y/y increase in operating expenses (excluding provisions) to KES 9.1 billion, the cost-to-income ratio (excluding provisions) dipped by 390 bps to 48.5% owing to the faster rise in total operating income in comparison to operating expenses.

In 1Q2019 the group's loan loss provisions surged by 93.8% y/y to KES 1.2 billion. The cost of risk increased by 40 bps to 1.0% in line with management expectations. Asset quality however improved as the NPL ratio (gross NPL/ gross loan book) eased to 7.7% (1Q2018: 9.8%).

The group is committed to growing its loan book (and therefore interest income) despite the interest rate caps. We are optimistic about the improvement in asset quality and the group's cost management.

Additionally, we are optimistic about the growth in non-funded income as cost optimization alone is not a sustainable way to grow profits. We are encouraged by its investments in digital assets particularly in the mobile space. We note that in 1Q2019, 91.0% of transactions were performed outside the branch with non-branch revenues growing by 137.0% y/y to KES 3.2 billion. We are also optimistic that South Sudan is on a recovery path following the progressively lower inflation rates (should mitigate impact of hyperinflationary accounting).

### Equity Group Holdings

We recommend a **LONG TERM BUY** on Equity Group Holdings. Currently, Equity is trading at a P/B of 1.59x (at a price of KES 39.95 compared to the average banking sector P/B of 0.85x as at 7th June 2019). We attribute the high P/B ratio to high growth expectations by investors. Equity has a high ROaE of 21.1% (the second highest in the banking sector) which is well above the industry average of 13.5%.

The current business model, hinged on technology, innovation and business diversification affirms the group's competitive advantage in an industry adapting to the digitization strategy amidst the current regulatory challenges. Thus, we believe this business model will support growth in the long-term.

The group's business model is tailored to address the emerging challenges in the banking sector. The model is hinged on the following focus areas:

- Non funded income growth - to support net interest income
- Regional diversification - to mitigate against regulatory risk
- Strengthening liquidity and balance sheet agility
- Treasury operations - to enhance treasury income
- Asset quality (especially with tougher regulations in the horizon)
- Innovation and digitization
- Efficiencies and cost optimization

In a bid to increase their footprint across Africa, the bank is set to acquire four banks in Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique.

Equity Bank expects to acquire 62% stake in Banque Populaire du Rwanda and full ownership of BancABC Zambia, BancABC Tanzania and BancABC Mozambique in a share- swap deal with London-listed Company Atlas Mara. This will expand the bank's operations to 8 countries within the African Continent.

### 1Q2019 Results commentary:

The Group registered a 4.9% y/y growth in after tax profits to KES 6.2 billion from KES 5.9 billion posted in 1Q2018. The performance was characterised by growth in both net interest income (+6.3% y/y to KES 10.4 billion) and non-funded income (+6.9% y/y to KES 7.2 billion) and a rise in operating expenses (including provisions) by 7.0% y/y to KES 8.8 billion. The main highlights were the recovery in the contribution of non-funded income to total income which had dipped in 1Q2018 and the continued underperformance in Tanzania. Additionally, the Group's asset quality deteriorated as the NPL ratio rose to 9.0% (1Q2018: 6.3%) mainly due to the challenging business environment in Tanzania as well as an increase in non-performing loans in the SME and large enterprise sectors in Kenya. C/I (excl. provisions) remained flat at 47.5%.

Going forward, the bank is keen on growing non-funded income in Tanzania (for instance, through merchant commission) and improving the quality of its loan book (lend less to the real estate sector and focus more on other sectors such as the consumer sector). In 1Q2019, the bank's subsidiaries contributed 17.0% to the profits before tax (KES 1.5 billion). The bank is in the process of acquiring four banks from Atlas Mara. The move will see it expand its operations in Tanzania and Rwanda (through merging with existing subsidiaries) and enter into Zambia and Mozambique markets. The acquisitions are part of its strategy to operate in fifteen countries by FY2024. We opine that the acquisition of the four new banks will help build economies of scale for the bank.

The bank is focused on lending more to customers and investing less in government securities (due to the decline in the yield on government securities). We opine that this shift will see an increase in the bank's cost of risk. Additionally, the bank is collaborating with Safaricom to enhance customer access to financial services, a partnership which it expects will grow its funded and non-funded income.

### **Cooperative Bank**

We recommend a **LONG TERM BUY** on Cooperative Bank with the counter trading at a P/B of 1.03x (at a price of KES 12.30) against an industry average of 0.85x as at 7th June 2019. The counter has a high ROaE of 18.2%, which is above the industry average of 13.5% with a dividend yield of 8.1%. Given the digital disruption in the banking industry, through its Soaring Eagle transformational agenda, the bank has been focusing on migrating banking transactions to alternative banking channels and automating key processes. We expect this to enable the bank to improve its efficiency. The bank is also exploring the use of data analytics (big data) to aid the development of systems and infrastructure while also providing insights on clients. Notably, the bank intends to undertake various initiatives to position itself as the leading bank in the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) segment.

### **1Q2019 Results commentary:**

The Group posted a 4.4% y/y growth in after tax profits to KES 3.6 billion (1Q2018: KES 3.4 billion). Total net interest income declined by 6.5% y/y to KES 6.9 billion. Non-funded income grew by 19.1% y/y to KES 4.1 billion. Total operating expenses (incl. provisions) declined by 1.2% y/y to KES 6.0 billion. The Group anticipates increased contribution to its bottom-line from its South Sudan subsidiary in FY2019, following the peace agreement, the decline in inflation and the resumption of dormant oil fields. The group also expect to revamp its digital banking sector as it prepares to launch seamless digital banking in August 2019 in a bid to increase commissions from their e-credit platforms. In

addition, Co-operative Bank is also setting its sights on regional expansion, mainly the Ethiopian market.

**Long Term Buy (for the 3 banks)** - To allow the banks to fully exploit their digital assets. The holding view also supported by consistency in dividend payout which should enhance total return.

For KCB and Equity, the long term view is also recommended due to the recent M&A activity (to enable full exploitation of the synergies identified or benefits from the restructuring efforts on the targets).

### **I&M Bank**

We recommend a **HOLD** on I&M Holdings. The bank is trading at a P/B ratio of 0.50x (at a price of KES 56.75 as at 7th June 2019), against the banking industry average P/B ratio of 0.85x. The counter has a ROaE of 17.9% in FY2018, higher than the industry (listed banks) average of 13.5%. Additionally, the bank's cost-to-income ratio(C/I ratio) of 36.6% is currently the lowest in the industry (average of 58.1%). The bank is keen on growing in contribution from its regional subsidiaries which contributed KES 2.3 billion (19.0%) to profit before tax in FY2018. For instance, in Uganda, it plans to expand its operations through acquisitions. We are also optimistic about the bank's revenue diversification (through its bancassurance and advisory business), given the prevailing interest capping, which we expect to boost non-funded income. The bank acquired Youjays Insurance Brokers in FY2018 to scale up its bancassurance business. Non-funded income registered significant growth in FY2018 (+31.8% y/y to KES 7.6 billion) boosting its contribution to total income to 32.8% (FY2017: 27.0%). Additionally, the low C/I ratio signals general improvement in the bank's efficiency, which we expect to be sustained going forward. We express concern over the high NPL ratio of 14.3% reported in FY2018 against the industry average of 12.0% and the decline in asset quality. The management attributed the high NPL ratio to loan book exposure to Real estate, Building and Construction and Manufacturing sectors (with the highest industry NPLs). According to the company, data analytics will be enhanced to lower the NPLs.

## **FY2018 Results Breakdown:**

The Group posted a 17.1% y/y growth in after tax profits for FY2018 to KES 8.5 billion (FY2017: KES 7.3 billion). The performance was characterized by a slight increase in net interest income, significant growth in non-funded income and a marginal increase in operating expenses. Total interest income grew by 6.4% y/y to KES 26.0 billion. The rise in total interest income was predominantly driven by a 9.5% y/y increase in interest income from loans and advances to KES 20.7 billion due to a 9.0% y/y growth in loans and advances to customers (net) to KES 166.7 billion. The yield on loans dipped by 20bps to 12.9%. Interest income from government securities fell by 7.4% y/y to KES 5.0 billion, owing to a decline in the Group's holdings of government securities by 20.0% y/y to KES 39.0 billion. Yield on government securities remained flat at 11.3%. Total interest expenses increased by 17.3% y/y to KES 10.4 billion mainly due to a 16.2% y/y rise in interest expenses from customer deposits. Customer deposits grew by 25.9% y/y to KES 213.1 billion. The growth in customer deposits was highest in business banking with a growth of 35.0%, while corporate & institutional and retail deposits grew by 7.4% and 5.0% respectively. The cost of funds declined by 30bps to 4.9% (FY2017: 5.2%). The cost of risk fell to 2.3% (FY2017: 2.7%). Absolute net interest margin grew by 0.3% y/y to KES 15.6 billion. The net interest margin dipped by 100bps to 7.0%. Non-funded income grew by 31.8% y/y to KES 7.6 billion supported by a growth in foreign exchange trading income (+40.4% y/y to KES 2.6 billion) and an increase in income from fees and commissions on loans and advances (+59.1% to KES 1.8 billion). This drove non funded income contribution to 32.8% (FY2017: 27.0%). Operating expenses (excl. provisions) rose by 8.3% y/y to KES 8.5 billion primarily owing to a 9.7% y/y growth in staff costs to KES 4.1 billion and a 7.1% y/y growth in other expenses to KES 3.1 billion. C/I (excl. provisions) edged up by 20bps to 36.6%. Loan loss provisions declined by 8.1% y/y to KES 3.8 billion. The bank's asset quality however deteriorated as NPLs stood at 14.3% (FY2017: 12.7%) driven by exposure

to building and construction, real estate and manufacturing sectors. We expect continued growth in non-funded income over the medium term. We however express concern over the bank's decline in asset quality.

## **Barclays Bank of Kenya**

We recommend a **HOLD** on Barclays Bank with the counter trading at a P/B of 1.28x (at a price of KES 10.40) against an industry average of 0.85x as at 7th June 2019. The counter has a high ROaE of 17.1%, which is above the industry average of 13.5%. Additionally, the counter has a high dividend yield at 10.6%. The Bank has been relying on its investments in technology – leveraging it to improve operational efficiency. This has notably been evidenced through the reduction in the number of traditional branches (and consequently staff headcount) and focus on alternative banking channels (mobile and internet banking). We expect the bank to continue focusing on alternative banking channels to drive revenue growth and improve efficiencies. Moreover, following the reduction of Barclays PLC's stake in Absa Group (formerly Barclays Africa Group), we expect the bank to utilize this new 'freedom' to pursue new products more tailored towards the local market.

## **1Q2019 Results commentary:**

The Group posted a 0.9% y/y growth in after tax profits for 1Q2019 to KES 1.9 billion. The performance was underpinned by a 14.0% y/y growth in non-funded income to KES 2.6 billion and a 3.1% y/y decline in operating expenses (excluding provisions) to KES 4.3 billion. Net interest income declined by 1.3% y/y to KES 5.4 billion. Consequently, the net interest margin eased to 7.9% (1Q2018: 9.0%). The non-funded income growth (+14.0% y/y to KES 2.6 billion) was buoyed by a 108.2% y/y surge in fees on commissions against the loan book to KES 359.1 million. The group is focused on reducing dependency on net interest income to grow its top-line. We express concern over the decline in net interest income. We are however optimistic about the new direction the

company is taking in terms of reinventing its business model to better suit the Kenyan (African) market.

### **Diamond Trust Bank**

We recommend a **HOLD** on Diamond Trust Bank. Trading at a P/B ratio of 0.62x (at a price of KES 119.75 as at 7th June 2019), makes the counter attractive when compared against the banking industry average P/B ratio of 0.85x. Additionally, the counter realized a ROaE of 13.9% in FY2018 – in line with the industry average of 13.5%. With the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development as the top shareholder, the bank has continued to reap the benefits arising from shared ownership with organizations in other industries (Jubilee Holdings and NMG). DTB has leveraged this ecosystem to diversify its revenues. The bank has a very conservative and defensive business model. Although this model has benefited them with low NPLs, it has also lowered returns for the bank. Going forward, we expect DTB to continue to diversify its revenue streams while leveraging on technology to improve operational efficiency.

#### **1Q2019 Results commentary:**

The Group posted a 9.3% y/y growth in after tax profits to KES 2.0 billion. The increase in profitability was primarily due to a 61.5% y/y decline in loan loss provisions to KES 268.4 million and a 15.3% y/y growth in non-funded income to KES 1.5 billion. Total interest income declined by 5.1% y/y to KES 8.2 billion owing to a 10.1% y/y dip in income from loans and advances to KES 4.9 billion as the group's loan book contracted by 2.9% y/y to KES 188.6 billion. Interest income from government securities grew by 2.4% y/y to KES 3.1 billion as the group's holding of government securities edged up by 5.3% y/y to KES 125.7 billion. Owing to the faster decline in total interest income compared to total interest expenses, net interest income declined by 6.6% y/y to KES 4.5 billion resulting in a NIM of 5.6% (1Q2018: 5.9%). Loan loss provisions fell by 61.5% y/y to KES 268.4 million (1Q2018: KES 696.5 million) despite a 4.8% y/y increase in

gross non-performing loans to KES 29.7 billion. This led to a slightly higher NPL ratio (as measured against the net loan book) of 15.8% (1Q2018: 14.6%). We note with concern over the slow growth in customer deposits, the decline in the loan book and consequent dip in net interest income. However, we are optimistic about the growth in non-funded income. The group's is focused on leveraging on technology and innovation to address the needs of SMEs.

### **National Bank of Kenya**

We recommend a **HOLD** (to take up the offer) on National Bank of Kenya (NBK). NBK is currently trading at a P/B of 0.22x, compared to industry (listed banks) average of 0.85x at a price of KES 4.44 as at 7th June 2019. We believe this low P/B is a value trap i.e. it's more of a case of "cheap is expensive" rather than attractiveness. The bank has a significantly high cost to income ratio at 92.0 % (industry average is 58.1%). We attribute this to bank's slow pace in embracing alternative channels. National Bank also has the second lowest return on equity amongst the listed banks, at 0.1%.

KCB Group has offered to fully takeover NBK. KCB has proposed an all equity deal where shareholders of NBK will get 1 KCB share for every 10 shares of NBK. We recommend taking up the offer. Our biggest concern with NBK is its weak corporate governance. We believe this is an area that NBK shareholders will greatly benefit from once (and if) KCB takeovers NBK. With better management, we expect to see a better utilization of some its resources (loan origination from its deposits), a more rapid pace in embracing alternative channels and growth in non-funded income streams.

#### **1Q2019 Results commentary:**

NBK registered an after tax profit of KES 106.3 million in 1Q2019 from an after tax loss of 278.5 million realized in 1Q2018. The growth in profitability was mainly attributed to a 41.7% y/y growth in net interest income to KES 1.7 billion. Total interest income rose by 18.7% y/y to KES 2.4 billion

driven by higher interest income from government securities (+24.8 y/y to KES 1.2 billion) and the loan book (+14.5% y/y to KES 1.2 billion). The rise in interest income on loans and advances was attributed to a higher yield on loans (10.0% from 7.5%) as the loan book dipped by 10.2% to KES 45.9 billion. Total interest expenses dipped by 17.8% y/y to KES 632.6 million owing to a 10.6% y/y decline in interest expenses on customer deposits to KES 604.5 million.

Non-funded income declined by 9.2% y/y to KES 501.7 million mainly on the back of a 98.5% y/y decline in income from fees and commissions on loans and advances to KES 2.1 million.

Loan loss provisions rose to KES 357.1 million from negative provisions of KES 70.8 million in 1Q2018. We opine that the increase in provisioning was due to IFRS 9 revision requirements. Asset quality continued to deteriorate as gross NPLs rose by 8.8% y/y to KES 31.5 billion leading to a higher NPL ratio (measured against net loans) of 68.5% (1Q2019: 56.58%). We note with concern over the deteriorating asset quality, contracting loan book and the decline in non-funded income.

#### **INSURANCE SECTOR:**

The insurance sector in Kenya has been persistently characterized by low insurance penetration rates. Although the low penetration rates indicate a huge potential for this sector, they more accurately reflect several challenges that plague the sector. These challenges include: the affordability of insurance premiums, lack of trust (especially in regard to claim settlement) and negative perceptions informed by cultural beliefs. These factors have derailed the little product innovation coming out of this sector. For instance, micro insurance has not gained much traction. Fraud (and costs associated with reducing its prevalence) and intense competition (characterized by price undercutting) among the players are also hampering profitability of the insurance sector. In other segments such as health insurance, competition comes from government sponsored initiatives such as the National Health Insurance Fund that are tackling some the challenges faced by private players (notably affordability of premiums).

Due to these challenges, insurance companies are more dependent on investment income which tends to be volatile (particularly for players overweight in listed equities). Due to the aforementioned challenges, we recommend underweighting the insurance sector.

#### **Jubilee Holdings**

We recommend a **\*LONG TERM BUY** on Jubilee Holdings. The company, through its subsidiaries, provides all classes of insurance and has a strong market presence in East Africa. Moreover, the company's associate businesses (Bujagali Energy Limited, Farmers Choice Limited, and Seacom) have strong fundamentals. Jubilee's growth strategy in the long-term business has been hinged on sustained product development, pricing efficiency and adaptability to market trends. We expect the Group to continue to focus on fraud management especially in their short-term business in order to minimize claims. With regards to medical insurance, we expect the Group to implement cost minimization measures to enable the provision of affordable premiums. In May 2019, Jubilee Financial Services Limited was licensed by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) to operate as a fund manager (a collective investment scheme that manages a portfolio of securities). We expect the new business to enhance top-line performance. Jubilee is currently trading at a P/B of 1.09x (at a price of KES 395.00) against an industry average of 0.88x as at 7th June 2019 – higher due to its attractive fundamentals.

\*The stock is relatively illiquid which means that the buyer may take a discount when exiting. Therefore, we recommend holding it for the long-term to allow for substantial capital appreciation. This will allow the investor to make a meaningful return even with the discount. Additionally, holding it for the long-term allows for the growth of the company's new business (fund management).

## TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR:

### Safaricom

We recommend a **HOLD** on Safaricom. The counter is currently trading at a P/E multiple of 17.53x (at a price of KES 27.70, as at 7th June 2019). The company is a market leader in the telecommunications industry with a market share of 63.3% (4Q2018) of total mobile subscriptions. This represents a 39.9% market lead over its closest competitor Airtel Kenya. The market share gap between Safaricom and its competitors has been supported by the company's heavy CAPEX spend over the years. Mobile data and M-PESA continue to be a key revenue drivers for Safaricom. The company has continued to leverage on the success of MPESA with new initiatives being based on the money transfer platform. We also note that the company is also pursuing opportunities outside Kenya. For instance, Safaricom is in talks with the Ethiopian government to introduce M-PESA in Ethiopia. In spite of the rising competitive and regulatory pressure (anticipated regulations based on the dominance study) we remain optimistic that the company will remain competitive. Furthermore, even with the recent increase in excise taxes (on mobile money transfer services, telephone and data services), we opine that subscription numbers will not be significantly affected owing to the high costs of switching to other networks. The large M-PESA ecosystem (agent network, customers, business vendors...) coupled with better coverage and reliability will deter users from shifting to other networks. A key risk we see with the MPESA ecosystem is the proposal by CA to enhance and extend the mobile interoperability. This may see the introduction agent to agent interoperability. This coupled with the current wallet to wallet interoperability may help smaller operators grow their ecosystems much faster. Agent to agent interoperability will likely require lengthy and wide consultations to implement and thus will only be a possibility in the medium to long term.

### FY2019 Results commentary:

The company's after tax profits grew by 14.7% y/y in FY2019 to KES 63.4 billion (FY2018: KES 55.3 billion). See a breakdown of the results of [here](#):

The revenue performance from the different mobile segments was a mixed bag. On one hand, MPESA delivered growth but on the other hand, the legacy business segments (Voice, SMS and mobile data) significantly slowed down.

The decline in voice and SMS is not unique to Safaricom. Globally these segments have been commoditized, which means that cheaper pricing is only way to grow usage. In the messaging segment cheaper and richer alternatives in the form of over the top applications (such as Whatsapp) are preferred by users. OTT players have also contributed to the decline of the telcos' share of international voice traffic. We expect the company to rely more on promotional activities, personal offerings and blended offers to grow usage in these segments.

We opine that margin preservation will be key in these segments. This can be achieved by leveraging more efficient technologies. For instance voice over LTE which uses LTE network for voice calls can also be used to deliver voice traffic more efficiently. Similar technologies (such as Rich Communication Services) can also be used to augment the short messaging services. We do note however that the impact of these technologies may only be in the long term due to the slow adoption rates (chicken and egg problem). Therefore in the short to medium term, we expect margin pressure on these segments.

We believe the company will still try to improve the affordability of data bundles. For instance, the company is now offering free (based on quota) YouTube access on its All in one bundle. This means the yields are likely to decline. Margin preservation for the mobile data segment can also be achieved through leveraging of more efficient technologies for instance, by shifting more traffic to the LTE network (accelerating the use of 4G through reducing cost of smartphone ownership-reduce 4G handset cost and increase affordability of data bundles), data caching and peering (this would help them lower international bandwidth costs).

Growth in MPESA revenue was supported by a bigger MPESA ecosystem (products, agents, customers). MPESA revenue profile has continued to shift reflecting a preference for more transactions that are

done within the MPESA ecosystem (fewer withdrawals). In FY2019 new business and P2P accounted for 61.6% up from 52.6% in FY2016. Over the same period, withdrawals accounted for 38.4% down from 47.4% in FY2016. As a result of the higher proportion of revenue from the new business and P2P which the company does not pay commissions on, MPESA revenue contribution margin has improved from 64.6% in FY2016 to 70.3% in FY2019. We believe this shift is more sustainable (there's sustainability in revenues and margin improvement). The company's partnership with Equity bank will enable MPESA expansion to other countries. This will further boost revenues for the company. Although MPESA revenues seem resilient, the uncertain regulatory environment is a key risk. We expect the company's continuous innovation and investments in partnerships will continue delivering growth.

MPESA has also contributed significantly to cost containment through the airtime recharges done through MPESA. We believe that airtime recharges through MPESA and improvements in the revenue profile via MPESA have partly contributed to the decline in the direct cost intensity from 40.6% in FY2012 to 28.6% in FY2019. Cost containment has also been achieved through economies of scale (e.g. better rates for maintenance of the passive and active network) and shift from leased fibre network to its own fibre network. We expect even more cost savings from investments in more efficient technologies such as Tube star base stations and 500G network.

## **CONSTRUCTION SECTOR:**

### **Bamburi Cement**

We place a **HOLD** recommendation on Bamburi Cement. The company has a dividend yield of 4.2% (at a price of KES 122.50 as at 7th June 2019) and is trading at a P/E ratio of 50.00x, (high due to its low EPS). Bamburi Cement has a strong market presence in the East African region with key markets in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. In FY2018 the company completed the first phase of its capacity expansion project in both Kenya and Uganda which cost KES 7.9 billion. As competition continues to intensify within the cement sector (particularly in the retail

market), we expect Bamburi to register subdued revenue growths (as compared to historical trends) due to lower prices. In light of this, cost minimization strategies will be key in driving growth in the bottom-line. The company has consistently been implementing various cost reduction initiatives specifically aimed at energy costs such as the use of alternative fuels such as petcoke and biomass.

### **FY2018 Results commentary:**

The company encountered a challenging year in FY2018 – resulting in a 68.9% y/y decline in after tax profits mainly due to a challenging operating environment in Kenya and Uganda. Bamburi Cement realized a ROaE of 0.5% in FY2018 significantly lower than 6.4% recorded in FY2017. According to the company, the decline in performance is due to: a higher cost environment owing to higher energy costs (power, coal and petcoke), imported clinker and raw materials' input prices (in both Kenya and Uganda). Additionally, Uganda was impacted by further provisioning primarily on receivables. The company has a dividend yield of 4.1% (at a price of KES 125.00 as at 7th June 2019) and is trading at a P/E ratio of 27.53x, (high due to its low EPS). The increase in dividends (from KES 4.10 to KES 5.10) suggests the current investments in place are enough to fully exploit the current growth opportunities in the market (the company noted that installed capacity continues to outstrip cement demand).

## **MANUFACTURING SECTOR:**

### **EABL**

We place a **HOLD** recommendation on EABL. The company is the largest branded alcohol beverage business within East Africa. Furthermore, the company is 50.03% owned by Diageo – a multinational alcoholic beverage company. We expect EABL to focus on sustaining the growth momentum of spirits and value beer, through capacity investments. The company has been redirecting its focus towards the



spirits and value beer categories as opposed to the mainstream and premium beer categories due to declining beer sales occasioned by evolving consumer trends and higher excise taxes. The company is constructing a KES 14.0 billion brewery in Kisumu – which will initially produce Senator Keg (value beer). This brewery is expected to commence operations in July 2019. Moreover, the company has completed the construction of a new spirits line at its headquarters in Ruaraka at a cost of KES 600.0 million, in order to meet the rising demand for spirits (being driven by a growing middle class with higher disposable income). However, we note with concern on the implementation of the Excise Act that gives the Treasury and the Kenya Revenue Authority the power to implement inflation-based tax increases. This may hamper demand through higher retail prices. EABL has an attractive ROaE of 61.4% with a modest dividend yield of 3.7%. The company is trading at a P/E ratio of 28.20x, (at a price of KES 205.25) as at 7th June 2019.

### Mumias

We recommend a **SELL** on Mumias Sugar. Despite the strong brand, we opine that Mumias Sugar cannot effectively compete in its current state and the challenges in the local sugar industry. We also note the historically weak corporate governance which have contributed lack of a clear strategy to reverse its fortunes. Mumias sugar continues to face several challenges in its operations including cane supply shortage, competition from other millers, sub optimal plant due to aging and sugar imports.


### 1H2019 Results commentary:

For H12019, revenues declined by 96% y/y to KES 26.0 million. Loss for the same period narrowed by 21% y/y to KES 1.5 billion from KES 2.0 billion. According to management, the loss was predominantly driven by shortage of cane which forced the company to bank on the sale of ethanol. This performance confirms that the company is not in a position to take advantage of the opportunities in the sugar industry.

## ENERGY SECTOR:

### KenGen

We recommend a **BUY** on KenGen but revise the strategy from a BUY & HOLD to a Trading One. We believe a trading strategy is better suited due to the stock's volatility. As at the end of FY2018, the counter had a market share of 69.0% with an installed capacity of 1,631 MW distributed amongst various power sources as shown below. The company is currently trading at a P/E of 4.98x, (at a price of KES 5.98) as at 7th June 2019, lower than the industry average of 5.33x (excluding Umeme).



Source: Company Reports

The company plans to increase installed capacity by an additional 721 MW by 2020 through a geothermal led strategy. We expect these additions to enhance revenues in the long-term. The development projects lined up are shown below:

| Development Projects  | MW | Status                     |
|-----------------------|----|----------------------------|
| Olkaria Wellheads     | 25 | Commissioned               |
| Ngong Phase 3         | 10 | Optimization Study         |
| Olkaria I AU Uprating | 30 | Financing                  |
| Olkaria IV Uprating   | 30 | Financing                  |
| Olkaria I Unit 6      | 70 | Procurement of Contractors |

|                   |            |                           |
|-------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Olkaria 1 Rehab   | 6          | Financing Committed       |
| Olkaria V         | 140        | Construction Ongoing      |
| Wellhead Plants   | 50         | Procurement of Developers |
| Meru Wind Phase 1 | 80         | Financing Committed       |
| Olkaria VI        | 140        | Project Development       |
| Olkaria VII       | 140        | Project Development       |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>721</b> |                           |

Source: Company Reports

KenGen also recently revealed that it is currently seeking KES 5.7 billion from multiple financiers to fund the construction of a 45 MW solar power plant. KenGen's after tax profits for FY2018 declined by 12.4% y/y to KES 7.9 billion from KES 9.0 billion recorded in FY2017. The dip in after tax profits was predominantly attributable to an 8.5% y/y rise in operating expenses to KES 23.7 billion (FY2017: KES 21.8 billion), a 57.0% y/y increase in the income tax expense to KES 3.4 billion and a 405.9% y/y decline in other net gains from KES 343.3 million to a net loss of KES 1.0 billion (impacted by revaluation losses attributable to adverse currency movements). As the next power plant is expected to be commissioned in FY2020, we do not expect KenGen to benefit from any tax allowances in FY2019. We also note that since the company has been exempted from paying compensating tax in the Finance Bill 2018, we expect their dividend policy to be much more consistent, going forward.

## INVESTMENT SECTOR:

### Centum

We recommend a **LONG TERM BUY** on Centum. Our recommendation is based on the relatively good financial performance. In 1H2019, Centum posted a 27.5% y/y growth in consolidated after tax profits for

<sup>1</sup> Except for Sidian Bank. We opine that the 1.16x P/B is too high

1H2019 to KES 2.1 billion (1H2018: KES 1.6 billion). The rise in profitability was mainly driven by higher investment income, which surged by 84.1% y/y to KES 4.1 billion. Investment income was lifted by a KES 1.2 billion gain from the sale of GenAfrica Asset Managers, and a 33.1% y/y rise in valuation gains owing to improved investment property valuations validated by revenue potential for pre-sales worth KES 1.8 billion. We also note that the company's share price is trading at a significant discount to the Net Asset Value (NAV) per share. At the end of the 1H2019, the company's NAV per share stood at KES 73.2 (reflecting a CAGR of 20.8% between FY2014 and FY2018), a 54.8% discount to the company's share price of KES 33.25 as at 7th June 2019.

We opine that the company's NAV (and asset valuations<sup>1</sup>) is conservative. For instance the company does not recognize control premiums where they have a controlling stake. Furthermore, development rights are being carried at a discount to actual valuations. For instance, the available Two Rivers development rights (est. 1.37 million SQM) are carried at a 50.0% discount to the valuation. We also see the conservative valuations in the exits. The company has had eight exits in the last five years with each valued higher than the carrying value. In the GenAfrica exit, for instance, the company realized a sale value of KES 2.3 billion compared to a carrying value of 1.4 billion on selling its 73.4% stake. We expect the company to channel exit proceeds towards reducing their debt burden and for investment in cash generative assets. The shift from Greenfield ventures to cash generative ventures is hinged on 3 business lines: (i) private equity to invest in large ticket assets (50.0 billion PE fund), (ii) real estate (selling unserviced land, development rights and apartments) and (iii) marketable securities. This move will enhance net cashflow for the company, ultimately enabling a higher dividend payout.

## Summary

| Counter                | Recommendation | 52-Week High | 52-Week Low | YTD Change | Price as at 7th June 2019 |
|------------------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|------------|---------------------------|
| KCB Group              | Long-term Buy  | 52.00        | 34.00       | 5.61%      | 39.55                     |
| Equity Group Holdings  | Long-term Buy  | 53.50        | 32.50       | 14.63%     | 39.95                     |
| Cooperative Bank       | Long-term Buy  | 18.70        | 11.00       | -13.99%    | 12.30                     |
| I&M                    | Hold           | 115.25       | 40.50       | -32.06%    | 57.75                     |
| Barclays Bank of Kenya | Hold           | 12.75        | 9.50        | -5.02%     | 10.40                     |
| Diamond Trust Bank     | Hold           | 205.00       | 109.00      | -23.48%    | 119.75                    |
| NBK                    | Hold           | 7.00         | 3.60        | -16.54%    | 4.44                      |
| Jubilee Holdings       | Long-term Buy  | 530.00       | 355.25      | -2.41%     | 395.00                    |
| Bamburi Cement         | Hold           | 190.00       | 110.00      | -7.55%     | 112.50                    |
| Safaricom              | Hold           | 30.50        | 21.00       | 24.77%     | 27.70                     |
| EABL                   | Hold           | 240.00       | 160.00      | 17.45%     | 202.25                    |
| KenGen                 | Trading        | 7.95         | 5.10        | -14.81%    | 5.98                      |
| Mumias                 | Sell           | 0.90         | 0.27        | -36.21%    | 0.37                      |
| Centum                 | Long-term Buy  | 39.25        | 22.50       | 13.68%     | 33.25                     |

For Online Share Trading (OST) via browser, please click [here](#):

For the Faida M-Trader Application, please click [here](#):



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**Recommendation Guide:**

**LONG-TERM BUY:** The company has strong fundamentals (strong financial performance, clear/reasonable strategy, competent management team etc.). However, there are certain investments or strategies that would require an investor to have a long term view of the company to allow for capital appreciation.

**BUY:** Strong fundamentals. Target price represents an upside higher than 15%

**HOLD:** Stock is correctly priced. Target price represents a downside/upside within the -15% to 15% range

**SELL:** Deteriorating fundamentals. Target price represents a downside lower than -15%

**TRADING:** The stock's price tends to be volatile (rises and falls often). Investors should therefore trade more frequently (timely entries and exits) to take advantage of the movements in price

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